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Revisiting the liability of fire services  
Eleanor J Russell, Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
The author considers the significance of the Inner House decision 
in A J Allan (Blairnyle) Limited v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] 
CSIH 3, the latest in a line of cases involving the potential liability 
of the fire service. Not only is the case an important one in relation 
to the potential liability of firefighters (and public authority liability 
more generally), but it also considers the increasingly important 
role of policy in determining the scope of any duty of care. 
Introduction 
The “floodgates” fear is a policy consideration which often features 
in the judicial determination as to the existence or scope of a duty 
of care in a given set of circumstances. The classic articulation of 
the courts’ concern in this regard is perhaps that of Cardozo C J in 
Ultramares Corporation v Touche (1931) 255 NY 170 (at 179) 
where he warned against “liability in an indeterminate amount for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.” Policy 
considerations may appear in many guises (e.g. the cost to the 
public purse, the risk of emergence of defensive practices) but 
essentially all such considerations address the issue of whether 
the imposition of a duty of care in any given set of circumstances 
will do more harm than good. Policy has played an increasingly 
important role in the duty enquiry in recent years and its 
ascendency in the overall determination of the duty issue is clearly 
articulated in the recent Inner House decision in AJ Allan 
(Blairnyle) Limited v Strathclyde Fire Board. 
The case is also important because it lays to rest any continuing 
doubt that the law in Scotland differs from that in England in 
relation to the potential liability of fire services and similar 
authorities. When faced with a stark choice as to whether to follow 
the Scottish authority of Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue 
Services 2007 SLT 61 or the English Court of Appeal decision in 
Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1957] QB 
1004, (both of which involved the liability of fire services) the Inner 
House unanimously chose the latter course.  
 
The competing authorities  
Before considering the alleged facts and the opinions in AJ Allan, it 
is useful to set out briefly details of the key authorities which relate 
to the liability of fire authorities. Judges can hardly be said to have 
spoken with one voice on this issue. Capital & Counties (supra) 
was a decision of the English Court of Appeal and was described 
in AJ Allan by Lord Drummond Young (at para.66) as “the case 
that contains the most detailed discussion of the delictual liability of 
a fire authority.” Four appeals were heard together and while the 
Court of Appeal held that there could be liability in situations where 
the fire service attended a fire and made matters worse, it also 
held (in relation to the third of the four appeals) that there was no 
liability where the fire service attended and dealt with a fire and 
that fire subsequently reignited and caused property damage. In 
Burnett (supra), on the other hand, Lord Macphail declined to 
follow Capital & Counties, and held that liability could arise in the 
latter situation. In Burnett, the fire service had attended and 
attempted to extinguish a fire in the flat beneath the pursuer’s flat 
in Aberdeen. It failed properly to extinguish the fire, which 
continued to smoulder in the void between the two flats. The fire 
subsequently reignited and caused damage to the pursuer’s flat. 
Lord Macphail took the view that the fire service had undertaken 
responsibility - it had taken control of the investigation of the state 
of the pursuer’s flat and, in response to the defender’s argument 
that the alleged failures were merely “sins of omission”, Lord 
Macphail asserted that Scots law did not draw a distinction 
between acts and omissions such as was drawn in English law. 
His Lordship considered it fair, just and reasonable to impose upon 
the defender a duty to take all reasonable steps not only to 
extinguish the fire but also to establish whether circumstances 
existed which if not eliminated constituted a risk of reignition of the 
fire or its extension to the flat above. While Burnett is consistent 
with obiter dicta of Lord Macfadyen in the earlier Scottish decision 
in Duff v Highlands and Islands Fire Board 1995 SLT 1362, it was 
departed from in the recent case of Mackay v Scottish Fire and 
Rescue Service 2015 SLT 342.  
A J Allan (Blairnyle) Limited and another v Strathclyde Fire 
Board –the alleged facts of the case 
The first pursuers in the action, AJ Allan (Blairnyle) Limited, were 
the owners of a farmhouse in Gartocharn. The second pursuer 
was a director of the aforementioned company. He lived in a 
caravan but made use of the farmhouse kitchen. On 31 October 
2008, there was a fire involving the Rayburn stove in the 
farmhouse kitchen and a chimney. The second pursuer called the 
fire brigade. Firefighters arrived at the scene and, having 
apparently extinguished the blaze, left at about 3pm. In the early 
hours of the following morning, the fire reignited and the 
farmhouse burned down. The pursuers sought damages from the 
defenders in negligence. They averred that the fire reignited as a 
result of smouldering rotten timbers in the roof space. They 
asserted that once the fire appeared to be extinguished, the 
firefighters ought to have used a thermal imaging camera to locate 
any questionable areas and ought to have maintained a regular 
check on the farmhouse to ensure that the fire was truly 
extinguished.  
The facts averred in AJ Allan, as narrated above, were remarkably 
similar to those in the third case in Capital & Counties (which is 
discussed in more detail, below) and to those in Burnett. Indeed, 
the fire board acknowledged that the instant case was 
indistinguishable on its facts from Burnett. 
Decision at first instance in A J Allan  
The case came to debate on the procedure roll before Lord 
Brailsford. His Lordship held that the pursuers had pled a relevant 
case. (See [2014] CSOH 135; 2014 GWD 29-568). The general 
statutory duties imposed upon the defenders by the Fire (Scotland) 
Act 2005 were not inconsistent with the existence of a common 
law duty of care to the pursuers. The defenders were acting 
pursuant to a general statutory duty but the common law duty of 
care did not arise therefrom. Rather, it arose from the assumption 
of responsibility for tending to the fire situation. The situation as 
pled fell squarely within the category of case described and 
anticipated in Gorringe v Calderdale MBC [2004] 1 WLR 1057. The 
tripartite test in Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 
605 was satisfied (foreseeability, proximity and fairness). 
Essentially, therefore, the Lord Ordinary followed Lord Macphail’s 
decision in Burnett, supra. The Fire Board reclaimed. 
 
The Inner House –submissions of parties 
In the Inner House, the Board submitted that the action, as pled, 
was irrelevant. While the fire board owed a duty of care to the 
public at large, including the pursuers, the scope of that duty was 
restricted in that it was a duty to take reasonable care not to make 
things worse, in other words not to inflict a fresh injury. The Board 
had not made matters worse, nor had it inflicted a fresh injury. As 
the fire service was not liable in damages if it failed to attend a fire, 
it would be “unprincipled” to suggest that a fire service which 
attended and sought to extinguish a fire could be liable in 
damages. An analogy could be drawn with rescuers: there was no 
general duty to rescue, and if a rescuer made a negligent rescue 
attempt but did not negligently cause fresh injury, he incurred no 
liability. The Board therefore submitted that, in law, there were no 
duties of the scope contended for by the pursuers. Reliance was 
placed on East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] 
AC 74, Capital & Counties (supra) and Michael v Chief Constable 
of South Wales Police [2015] AC 1732. 
The pursuers, on the other hand, submitted that they had pled a 
relevant case and were entitled to proof. Their case was based on 
ordinary principles of common law negligence. The facts, as 
averred, disclosed an “assumption of responsibility” and a 
“relationship of proximity” between the parties, such as gave rise to 
a common law duty of care. There could be circumstances in 
which the fire service owed both broad duties to the public and 
specific duties to individuals. Support for the pursuers’ position 
was sought from a trilogy of Scottish cases: Burnett (supra) (which 
was said to be “entirely in point”); Duff (supra); and Gibson v Orr 
1999 SC 420.  
  
Decision of the Inner House 
The reclaiming motion was heard by an Extra Division comprising 
Lady Paton, Lady Dorrian and Lord Drummond Young. It was held 
unanimously that the reclaiming motion should be allowed and that 
the action should be dismissed as irrelevant. All three judges 
delivered a full opinion. Lady Paton’s opinion is found in paras.1-
37 of the court’s judgment. Under reference to the Fire (Scotland) 
Act 2005, her Ladyship observed (at para.12) that the Board was a 
statutory body subject to a “general public law duty to make 
provision for efficient fire-fighting services.” It was also clothed with 
certain statutory powers to enable it to deal with fires and other 
emergencies. No statutory duty was owed to private individuals 
such as might generate a private claim for damages nor did a 
private common law duty of care arise from the general public law 
duty.  
Lady Paton observed, however, that emergency services, 
including fire, police, and ambulance, had, in certain 
circumstances, been held liable in damages to private individuals 
for negligence in the performance of their duties. She identified a 
number of matters arising from the relevant authorities. The first 
matter was the development in the judicial approach to the nature 
and scope of any liability on the part of public authorities to 
individuals who make private claims in respect of the authorities’ 
alleged negligence in the performance of their public 
duties. In 1941, “a clearly defined and fairly restricted approach” 
was evident in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board (supra). 
There, a high tide broke the sea wall of the River Deben and the 
respondents' dairy farm land was flooded. The statutory drainage 
board attempted, rather unskilfully, to deal with the flooding. There, 
Viscount Simon LC stated (at 84-85): 
“It is not, of course, disputed that if the appellants, in the 
course of exercising their statutory powers, had inflicted 
fresh injury on the respondents through lack of care or skill, 
they would be liable in damages … But … nothing of this sort 
happened … the damage done by the flooding was not due 
to the exercise of the appellants’ statutory powers at all. It 
was due to the forces of nature which the appellants, albeit 
unskilfully, were endeavouring to counteract.  Supposing, for 
example, that after the appellants had made their first 
unsuccessful attempt they had decided to abandon their 
efforts altogether, the respondents could have had no legal 
claim against them for withdrawing, even though the result 
might have been to leave the respondents’ land indefinitely 
flooded.  …” 
Similarly Lord Romer explained (at 102): 
“…Where a statutory authority is entrusted with a mere 
power it cannot be made liable for any damage sustained by 
a member of the public by reason of a failure to exercise that 
power. If in the exercise of their discretion they embark upon 
an execution of the power, the only duty they owe to any 
member of the public is not thereby to add to the damages 
that he would have suffered had they done nothing.” 
Lady Paton observed that subsequent decisions tended to favour 
the finding of liability on the part of public bodies. Anns v Merton 
London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 provided an example of 
this more expansive approach. That decision was overturned, 
however, in Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398. 
There then followed a policy-based reversion to a more restrictive 
approach which is evident in the decision of the House of Lords in 
Mitchell v Glasgow City Council 2009 SC (HL) 21 and in the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Michael (supra). In both cases 
the need for a careful approach to the liability of public authorities 
was emphasised, particularly in view of the possible financial 
burden which private claims might have upon the limited resources 
of public authorities.  
Lady Paton went on to endorse the view of Turner J in Furnell v 
Flaherty [2013] EWHC 377 (QB) to the effect that there were two 
circumstances in which a public body might now incur liability to an 
individual for negligence in the English courts, namely (a) where 
the careless acts of the defendant have left the claimant in a worse 
position than if it had done nothing at all and (b) where there has 
been an assumption or attachment of responsibility. Situations 
where public service bodies had created an unnecessary danger, 
or had unnecessarily caused damage or injury included the first 
and second cases in Capital & Counties (supra). There, fire 
officers attending a fire in block A, turned off the sprinkler system. 
This resulted in the fire going out of control and spreading not only 
in block A but also to other blocks B and C. Relationships giving 
rise to an assumption of responsibility included those in which a 
duty to take positive action typically arose: contract, fiduciary 
relationships, employer and employee, school and pupil, health 
professional and patient. 
Lady Paton then alighted upon a second matter, namely the 
similarity between the circumstances of the instant case and those 
of the third case in Capital & Counties, (the London Fire Brigade 
case). There, a deliberate explosion was created on wasteland 
near the plaintiffs’ industrial premises. Burning debris scattered 
across a wide area and small fires broke out. The fire brigade was 
summoned but, by the time fire officers arrived, the fires had 
already been extinguished and there was no visible evidence of 
any continuing conflagration. Fire officers left the scene about 20 
minutes after the initial explosion without inspecting the plaintiffs’ 
premises. Later that evening a fire broke out at the plaintiffs’ 
premises, which were severely damaged. The plaintiffs alleged 
negligence against the fire authority’s employees in failing 
adequately to inspect the wasteland and the premises, and failing 
to ensure that all fires and risk of further fires in the vicinity had 
been eliminated before leaving. The Court of Appeal held that the 
fire brigade was not liable in respect of the plaintiffs’ loss. The 
following guidance was provided (at 1030 per Stuart Smith L.J.): 
 “[T]he fire brigade are not under a common law duty to 
answer the call for help, and are not under a duty to take 
care to do so. If, therefore, they fail to turn up, or fail to turn 
up in time, because they have carelessly misunderstood 
the message, got lost on the way or run into a tree, they 
are not liable.” 
Later in the court’s judgment, Stuart Smith L.J. said (at 1038): 
“[A] fire brigade does not enter into a sufficiently proximate 
relationship with the owner or occupier of premises to 
come under a duty of care merely by attending at the fire 
ground and fighting the fire; this is so, even though the 
senior officer actually assumes control of the fire-fighting 
operation.”  
The Court of Appeal’s conclusion was approved by the House of 
Lords in Gorringe (supra) and its approach was not criticised when 
discussed in the Supreme Court in Michael.  
A further matter arising from the authorities was the marked 
divergence between Scottish and English lines of authority in the 
context of the potential liability of a fire brigade. The Scottish Outer 
House decisions of Duff, Gibson, and Burnett criticised and 
departed from important aspects of the English authorities. Certain 
averments of alleged negligence in the Scottish cases were held 
relevant for proof in circumstances where an English court would 
probably have struck the cases out as irrelevant. Lady Paton 
concluded (at para.26) that “the carefully developed, policy-based, 
more restrictive approach currently approved and adopted by the 
Supreme Court must be followed by the Scottish courts (contrary 
to the views expressed in the Outer House in Duff, Gibson, and 
Burnett, but in keeping with a recent opinion of Lord McEwan in 
Mackay v Scottish Fire and Rescue Service 2015 SLT 342.)”  
Her Ladyship reached that conclusion for a number of reasons. 
First, she did not accept that the fire service “assumed 
responsibility” on the basis of answering a 999 call or attending the 
scene of a fire or taking steps to extinguish a fire or to save lives or 
property. Rather, those actions represented the fire service 
carrying out its statutory functions and public duty. Such actions 
did not constitute the undertaking of responsibility which would 
give rise to a duty of care on an orthodox common law basis. 
Secondly, whether one was concerned with the existence or scope 
of a duty of care, account had to be taken of general policy 
considerations, such as those expressed (under reference to 
Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923) by Lord Toulson JSC in Michael (at 
para.110): 
“ ..it is one thing for a public authority to provide a service at 
the public expense, and quite another to require the public to 
pay compensation when a failure to provide the service has 
resulted in a loss. Apart from possible cases involving 
reliance on a representation by the authority, the same loss 
would have been suffered if the service had not been 
provided in the first place, and to require payment of 
compensation would impose an additional burden on public 
funds.” 
Lord Toulson had further observed in Michael that the courts’ 
refusal to impose a private law duty on the police to safeguard 
victims of crime (except in cases of representation and reliance) 
did not involve according any special treatment to the police. The 
approach was entirely consistent with the manner in which the 
common law has been applied to other authorities vested with 
powers or duties as a matter of public law for the protection of the 
public. Examples could be found in relation to financial regulators, 
planning authorities and highway authorities. To impose liability on 
the police in such circumstances, would, in Lord Toulson’s view, 
“have potentially significant financial implications” (at para.122).  
His Lordship continued (at para.122): 
“The costs of dealing with claims, whether successful or 
unsuccessful, would have to come either from the police 
budget, with a corresponding reduction of spending on other 
services, or from an increased burden on the public or from a 
combination of the two …”  
Those observations, in Lady Paton’s view, were equally applicable 
to the fire service. Moreover, her Ladyship observed (at para.28) 
that it would be “unfortunate if a defensive approach were to be 
adopted by the fire service as a result of an appreciation that their 
efforts might be followed by actions for damages.”   
Lady Paton considered that analogies with the provision of 
medical/ ambulance services were inapt. Once the relationship of 
doctor / hospital and patient exists, a duty to take reasonable care 
to effect a cure is owed -not merely a duty to prevent further 
harm. The police and fire services’ primary obligation, on the other 
hand, was to the public at large.  
In addition, there was no general duty to rescue. If a rescuer 
makes a negligent rescue but does not negligently create a fresh 
injury, then he incurs no liability in damages (Capital & 
Counties). The fire service, with its statutory powers and duties, 
had been held not to be liable if it fails to attend a fire. It would be 
unprincipled therefore to suggest that a fire service which did 
attend a fire and sought to extinguish it could be held liable for its 
actions, other than in circumstances where it negligently inflicted 
fresh injury.  
Finally, the line of English authority relevant to the liability of public 
bodies including fire services (East Suffolk Rivers Catchment 
Board in 1941 to Michael in 2015) was well-established and of 
considerable authority. It would be unfortunate to adopt a different 
approach north of the border.   
Lady Paton concluded that, in the present case, the fire service 
owed a duty of care to the general public, including the pursuers, 
but that duty was to take care not negligently to add to the damage 
which the pursuers would have suffered if the fire service had done 
nothing; in other words, not negligently to inflict a fresh injury. No 
breach of that duty was said to have occurred. Further, the 
averments did not disclose circumstances which could properly be 
characterised as an “assumption of responsibility” by the 
defenders. Contrary to the views expressed by Lord Macphail in 
Burnett, Lady Paton did not consider it to be fair, just or reasonable 
to impose upon the fire service a duty of care of the scope 
contended for by the pursuers. The case, as pled, was accordingly 
irrelevant, and fell to be dismissed. In reaching that conclusion, 
Lady Paton disapproved of the Scottish authorities of Duff, Gibson, 
and Burnett. In none of those cases did the relevant court have the 
benefit of the guidance given by the House of Lords and the 
Supreme Court respectively in Mitchell and Michael. Moreover, in 
Lady Paton’s view, the relevant expression of opinion in Duff was 
brief and obiter, and gave too wide a definition of the scope and 
content of the duty owed to the public. Her Ladyship was unable to 
agree with a number of the views expressed by Lord Macphail in 
Burnett while the reasoning in Gibson did not accord with the line 
of authority from East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board to Michael.  
   
In her concurring opinion, Lady Dorrian rejected the pursuers’ 
argument that East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board was limited to 
cases where the authority was vested with a statutory power. Its 
reasoning applied equally to target duties expressed at a high level 
of generality (as in the instant case). The courts in Capital & 
Counties and Michael had concluded that the duties imposed upon 
the fire and police authorities, respectively, were duties owed to 
the public at large. In Capital & Counties, the Court of Appeal 
determined that by taking control the senior officer did not 
undertake a voluntary assumption of responsibility to the owner of 
the premises on fire. In Michael, (which involved a police failure to 
answer a call) the core duty of the police was said not to involve 
the kind of close or special relationship necessary for the 
imposition of a private law duty. Capital & Counties was not 
restricted, as the pursuers argued, to situations where the fire 
service failed to attend. Rather, it extended to cases where the fire 
service took action to fight the fire, so long as its intervention did 
not make the situation worse. The third scenario in Capital & 
Counties was identical to the circumstances of AJ Allan and there 
was no indication in Michael that the Supreme Court thought that 
the conclusion in Capital & Counties was other than correct.  
As for the argument that the law of Scotland was explained in Duff, 
Burnett and Gibson, rather than Michael, Lady Dorrian observed 
that the principles underlying the reasoning in Michael were the 
same as those which underpin the law of Scotland in this area. 
The reasoning in Michael had relied upon the Scottish cases of 
Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 and 
Mitchell v Glasgow City Council 2008 SC 351. It had repeatedly 
been stated that the law on this matter was the same in both 
jurisdictions. The discussion of Duff and Burnett in Michael 
impliedly questioned the validity of the reasons given in Burnett for 
declining to follow Capital & Counties.   
Lady Dorrian highlighted (at para.48) “[t]he difficulty in confining 
the duty in circumstances such as the present.” The same point 
had arisen in Capital & Counties where, her Ladyship said, “[t]he 
submission was that the duty might extend to a whole district 
which was at risk if the fire got out of hand. In other words, in 
negligently failing to extinguish the fire at Pudding Lane, [the fire 
service] would be responsible for the destruction of St Paul’s 
Cathedral.” 
Lady Dorrian observed that Gibson could be distinguished on 
several grounds. That case concerned the liability of the police for 
failing to provide a warning of a serious road hazard (a collapsed 
bridge). Lord Hamilton’s rejection of the suggestion that the duties 
of the police were owed to the public at large therefore occurred in 
the context of the police exercising their civil function in relation to 
road traffic operations rather than in the context of their core duty 
to prevent and detect crime. In addition, taking control of and then 
abandoning a known hazard was analogous with a situation where 
the authority created the damage or made the situation worse. 
Finally, there could be identified only a limited class of individuals 
at particular risk from the hazard in Gibson. As far as Duff was 
concerned, Lord Macfadyen’s observations were obiter, and 
shortly stated. The case was decided before Capital & Counties 
and Gorringe. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board had been 
distinguished on the basis that it concerned statutory powers 
rather than duties, a distinction which Lady Dorrian found 
unconvincing given the broad nature of the statutory duties 
involved. As regards Burnett, part of the basis upon which Lord 
Macphail declined to follow Capital & Counties was that Scots law 
did not draw a distinction between acts and omissions comparable 
to that drawn in England. In Mitchell, however, Lord Reed (in the 
Inner House) recognised that both Scots and English law exhibited 
a general reluctance to impose affirmative duties to protect others. 
His views were endorsed in the House of Lords by Lord Hope (at 
para.34). Lord Hope also stated (at para.25) that: “the law of 
liability for negligence has developed on common lines both north 
and south of the border”.    
Similarly, in Michael it was said (at para.97 per Lord Toulson): 
“It is one thing to require a person who embarks upon an 
action which may harm others to exercise care. It is 
another matter to hold a person liable in damages for 
failing to prevent harm caused by someone else.” 
Against that background, Lady Dorrian concluded that the duties 
incumbent upon the fire service in the instant case were restricted 
in scope, liability being limited to the situation where the 
intervention created a new danger or made the situation 
worse. Lord Macphail’s observations in Burnett relating to the 
importance to be attached to the control exercised by the fire 
board over the fire site (at para.69) did not take account of the 
observations in Capital & Counties (at 1036) that the reason for 
conferral of such control was “for the benefit of the public generally 
where there may be conflicting interests.” Lady Dorrian declared 
herself unable to agree with Lord Macphail’s conclusion in 
Burnett.   
Finally Lady Dorrian observed that the ambulance cases did not 
assist the pursuers. The role of the ambulance service differed 
from that of the police and fire services. Once a call had been 
accepted by an ambulance, the service undertook to deal with a 
named individual at a specific address. The resulting relationship 
was “highly personal”. The same did not apply to the fire 
service. The duty prayed in aid in the instant case remained to the 
public at large, even if the primary beneficiary might be an 
individual householder. 
  
At the outset of his concurring opinion, Lord Drummond Young 
emphasised that the dispute related to the scope of the fire 
service’s duty of care, not its existence. While the Lord Ordinary 
had held that the fire board was under a duty to take reasonable 
care to extinguish all traces of fire in the premises, Lord 
Drummond Young did not consider that the duty extended that far. 
Two reasons were proffered for that conclusion. First, there was no 
liability for pure omissions (Maloco (supra) (at 75-76); Michael (at 
para.97)). Secondly, policy considerations relating to the nature of 
a fire authority and the circumstances under which it operates 
militated against the imposition of liability.  
In relation to the first issue, namely that pure omissions do not 
sound in damages, Lord Drummond Young observed that a fire 
service normally attempts to control and extinguish sources of 
danger that have been caused by others or by the forces of 
nature. The police (in relation to their function of preventing and 
detecting crime) also deal with the wrongdoing (or threats thereof) 
of third parties. A failure by such an authority will not amount to a 
positive act but merely an omission to deal with a situation created 
by others or by natural forces. There is no general duty to prevent 
a third party or natural forces from causing harm. While an 
omission in the course of active conduct may be actionable (e.g. a 
driver who omits to keep a proper lookout), without such active 
conduct there is generally no liability. If there is no liability for 
inaction, the logical corollary is that there can be no liability for 
acting negligently, provided that the ultimate result is no worse 
than would have occurred without intervention. The rule that there 
is no liability for pure omissions is not absolute, however. Lord 
Drummond Young identified four exceptions to it, as follows. 
(1) If the defender does act and makes matters worse, liability may 
ensue, as discussed in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board. 
There the damage was caused by acts of nature, not by the 
board’s intervention. East Suffolk was followed in Capital & 
Counties where liability was established in the first two appeals 
because the authority had made matters worse by turning off the 
sprinkler system. (2) Where the defender is in control of the 
wrongdoer, he may be under a duty to control the wrongdoer’s 
actions (Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 
1004). Similarly, where the defender is in control of a situation that 
presents a danger to others, the fact of control carries 
responsibility to take reasonable steps to avoid the danger of 
harm. (In Gibson (supra) police constables took charge of a 
situation involving a collapsed bridge. They placed warning cones 
on the north side of the bridge but failed to do anything on the 
south side. A car approaching from the south fell into the river. All 
but one of its occupants perished. Liability was established. Lord 
Hamilton remarked that the case could be regarded as one where 
the necessary proximity was brought into existence through an 
assumption of responsibility. (3) Liability for a failure to act may be 
imposed where there has been an undertaking of responsibility on 
the part of the defender to safeguard the pursuer (the principle 
established in Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 
465.) Fiduciary or contractual relationships may give rise to this 
sort of liability. (4) In some cases where acts of a third party harm 
the pursuer, liability for failing to act may be imposed on the 
defender because of the relationship between the defender and 
the pursuer (e.g. parent and child, school and pupil and employer 
and employee.)  
Lord Drummond Young considered both Capital & Counties and 
Michael in some detail. 
His Lordship observed that the Court of Appeal in Capital & 
Counties had concluded that the fire brigade was not under a 
common law duty to answer the call for help. If a fire authority did, 
however, answer the call for help, liability could only arise under 
one of the exceptions to the rule that there is no liability for pure 
omissions. It could not be said however that the fire brigade owed 
a duty of care to the owners of the afflicted or neighbouring 
properties once it had arrived at the fire ground and started to fight 
the fire on the basis of a sufficient relationship of proximity created 
by an assumption of responsibility and reliance. A fire brigade did 
not assume responsibility to deal with fires. Its duty was owed to 
the public at large to prevent the spread of fire, and that might 
involve a conflict between the interests of various owners of 
premises. The analogy given was that during the great fire of 
London the Duke of York required to blow up a number of houses 
not yet affected by fire in order to create a fire break. In asserting 
any such duty as a result of an undertaking, it was impossible to 
identify to whom any duty might be owed. The owner of the 
afflicted property would not be sufficient, because neighbouring 
premises could also be affected by a fire. The duty would have to 
extend, potentially at least, to an entire town or district on the basis 
that that was the extent of the potential risk but that was too wide a 
responsibility to generate a sufficient relationship of proximity. 
Unless there was an increase in the danger, there could be no 
liability. An analogy was drawn with a rescuer (at page 1037): 
“It is not clear why a rescuer who is not under an obligation 
to attempt a rescue should assume a duty to be careful in 
effecting the rescue merely by undertaking the attempt. It 
would be strange if such a person were liable to the 
dependants of a drowning man who but for his 
carelessness he would have saved, but without the attempt 
would have drowned anyway.”  
In Lord Drummond Young’s opinion, the analogy with a rescuer 
was a logical extension of the principle that there is no liability for 
pure omissions unless matters are made worse. A rescuer should 
not be taken to undertake responsibility to use due skill and care 
merely on account of attempting the rescue. That was the basis on 
which the third claim in Capital & Counties failed (owing to lack of 
sufficient proximity) and that claim was indistinguishable from the 
present one. 
Lord Drummond Young went on to observe that in Scotland a 
different view had been proffered in Duff and Burnett. In Michael, 
however, Lord Toulson had identified a key feature of the 
reasoning in Burnett as being the claim that Scots law draws no 
distinction between acts and omissions. Yet, precisely such a 
distinction had been central to the reasoning of the House of Lords 
in Mitchell (a Scottish appeal). That, in Lord Drummond Young’s 
view, was “a clear criticism of the decision in Burnett” (at para.73). 
 
Michael concerned the potential liability of a police force on receipt 
of a 999 call. The caller had reported threats by her former partner 
to kill her but the police response was delayed and by the time the 
police arrived, she had been murdered. It was held that English 
law did not as a general rule impose liability on a defendant for 
injury or damage to the person or property of a claimant caused by 
the conduct of a third party, (Maloco, supra). The fundamental 
reason for such an approach was that the common law did not, in 
general, impose liability for pure omissions. Lord Toulson observed 
(at paras.114-115): 
“It does not follow from the setting up of a protective 
system from public resources that if it fails to achieve its 
purpose, through organisational defects or fault on the part 
of an individual, the public at large should bear the 
additional burden of compensating a victim for harm 
caused by the actions of a third party for whose behaviour 
the state is not responsible. To impose such a burden 
would be contrary to the ordinary principles of the common 
law.”  
In addition, if the police, upon their intervention, owed a duty of 
care to (potential) victims of crime, difficulties would arise as to the 
range of responsibility involved - potentially the duty would be 
owed to almost anyone who claimed to be a victim. That difficulty 
underscored the fact that the duty of the police for the preservation 
of the peace was owed to members of the public at large, and did 
not involve the kind of closer special relationship (“proximity” or 
“neighbourhood”) required for the imposition of a private law duty 
of care. Moreover, the imposition of liability on the police to 
compensate victims of violence on the ground that the police 
should have prevented it would have potentially significant 
financial implications. Thus, Lord Drummond Young observed, the 
reasoning in Michael in relation to the police could be said to mirror 
the reasoning in Capital & Counties in relation to the fire service. 
  
Lord Drummond Young went on to observe that, in Michael, Lord 
Toulson had addressed certain general issues of public policy in 
relation to the imposition of liability in negligence on public 
authorities. In particular he had regard to the danger of a virtually 
unlimited duty and the possible financial implications. In Capital & 
Counties, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal had based its 
decision on the absence of proximity, and was generally 
unpersuaded by considerations of public policy. “This distinction” 
Lord Drummond Young said (at para.76) “may well reflect the state 
of development of the law in 1997 as against 2015.” In Capital & 
Counties the court approached the scope of the duty of care of the 
fire service on the basis of the tripartite analysis in Caparo 
(foreseeability, proximity and whether it was fair just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of a given scope (i.e. 
policy)). Foreseeability of damage was a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition. Lord Drummond Young continued (at para.77):  
“[I]t has come to be recognized that proximity together with 
foreseeability cannot, by themselves, provide a universal 
solution to every question involving the existence and scope 
of a duty of care. Instead policy must also be taken into 
account. It is this, I think, that is meant by the expression 
“fair, just and reasonable” in Lord Bridge’s formulation in 
Caparo. Proximity points to the closeness in fact of the 
relationship, and also to the question, which underlies the 
decision in Capital & Counties, of whether the relationship of 
the defender is with a small group of persons or the public 
generally. But policy introduces wider 
considerations. Moreover, it has in my view come to be 
recognized that proximity and policy cannot be looked at 
separately: they form parts of a single evaluative exercise 
which is designed to determine whether a duty of care exists 
and, if so, what its scope is. To the extent that Capital & 
Counties proceeds on the basis of proximity alone, without 
regard to questions of policy, I consider that it reflects the 
state of the law in 1997, when the tripartite test in Caparo 
was treated as providing a general scheme for the analysis 
of duties of care. Assuming foreseeability, the next question 
was whether proximity existed. If it did, the third question 
was whether there were policy considerations that tended to 
negative or limit the scope of such a duty of care. Today, 
however, it has come to be seen that proximity and policy 
are interdependent; except in established cases it is 
impossible to say that proximity exists without evaluating the 
relevant policy considerations. In a sense a finding that there 
is proximity is a statement of a result. The notion of proximity 
does not, except at a very general level, give much guidance 
as to how that result is reached; that is where policy is 
important.” 
Lord Drummond Young observed that relevant policy 
considerations can take different forms and will vary from case to 
case. It was considerations relevant to the liability of public 
authorities which were important in the present case. One such 
consideration was the need to avoid indeterminate liability: the 
need to keep delictual liability under reasonable control was an 
important factor in considering the liability of a public authority that 
operates for the benefit of the entire public. The potential liability of 
the fire service was extremely wide and might involve sharp 
conflicts given that the interests of members of the public may 
conflict. For example, a fire may break out in one property and 
threaten to spread along a row of properties. As a preventative 
measure, the fire service may consider it necessary to demolish 
the property adjacent to the fire in order to spare properties further 
along the row. In such circumstances the warning in Ultramares 
Corporation supra, was of relevance and care must be taken to 
avoid indeterminate liability. 
Furthermore when a public authority is found to be negligent, 
liability to pay compensation falls on the public purse and there is a 
danger that potential liability for negligence may inhibit the 
authority’s performance of its public functions, resulting in further 
hidden costs to the public. Moreover, it is generally economically 
desirable that the costs of any particular activity should fall on the 
participants. For example, in relation to commercial activities the 
costs will be passed on to customers. If, however, a public 
authority is liable for the costs of an incident, those costs will fall on 
the general public rather than the participants. In Lord Drummond 
Young’s view, these constituted grounds for restricting the liability 
of public authorities. Lord Drummond Young identified two further 
factors of possible relevance in claims against the emergency 
services. The first was the complexity of the operational demands 
that are made on such services. More than one emergency may 
arise at the same time, and difficult decisions will require to be 
taken as to the allocation of resources among them. It would be 
“inherently undesirable that decisions of this nature should be the 
subject of negligence claims” (para.81). The second relevant factor 
was the difficulty in dealing with an emergency where rapid action 
was required on the basis of incomplete information. Any potential 
liability must reflect that fact.   
Lord Drummond Young went on to observe that while the fire 
service and police had, in Capital & Counties and Michael, been 
held to be subject to relatively restricted duties of care, this 
approach had not been extended to the ambulance service: Kent v 
Griffiths, [2001] QB 36. There were two reasons for this. First, the 
ambulance service operates as part of the health service and 
provides services equivalent to those provided by medical staff; 
this distinguished it from the police and fire service. Secondly, the 
ambulance service normally deals with patients on an individual 
basis and the risk of conflict among commitments is accordingly 
reduced. The police and fire services, on the other hand, owe their 
primary duties to the public at large in relation to the prevention 
and detection of crime and outbreaks of fire respectively. The 
liability of the ambulance service could not therefore provide a 
good guide to the liabilities of the fire service.  
Lord Drummond Young concluded that good reasons existed for 
restricting the duty of care incumbent on the emergency 
services. The solution adopted was based on the fact that the 
emergency services generally act to deal with situations that are 
not of their own making. As a result, the common law rule against 
liability for pure omissions applied, subject to its various 
exceptions. Thus where the emergency service makes matters 
worse than would have been the case had it not intervened, 
liability exists (Capital & Counties.) The other exceptions may 
present greater difficulties in individual cases. Thus where the fire 
service attends a fire and begins to fight it, it might be argued that 
it has “taken control” of the situation, or has assumed some form of 
responsibility to the owners of the afflicted or neighbouring 
properties. Policy considerations became important at this 
stage. When it fights a fire, the fire service’s primary duty remains 
to the public as a whole. The interests of various proprietors may 
conflict. The fire service is usually dealing with a hazard created by 
others or by the forces of nature, in an emergency situation and 
with incomplete information. In Lord Drummond Young’s opinion, it 
could not be said that the fire service is in a situation of “control” 
when it is fighting a fire, rather it is seeking to achieve control. That 
was the situation in the instant case. 
  
Lord Drummond Young proceeded to examine the Scottish 
authorities. In Duff, Lord Macfadyen had (obiter), distinguished 
East Suffolk on the ground that the authority there was exercising 
a mere power whereas in Duff the fire board was acting under a 
statutory duty. Lord Drummond Young rejected that argument on 
the authority of Gorringe where it was held that the existence of 
statutory powers and duties was not relevant to common law 
negligence. In Duff, Lord Macfadyen held (again obiter) that, by 
attending and fighting a chimney fire, the authority placed itself 
under a duty to the owners of the property and neighbours to 
exercise reasonable care to extinguish the fire. That, Lord 
Drummond Young observed, was contrary to the decision in 
Capital & Counties.  
As far as Lord Macphail’s opinion in Burnett was concerned, it 
proceeded on a misunderstanding of the notion of pure omission. 
His analysis failed to recognize the underlying nature of the work 
of the fire service, namely dealing with situations created by others 
or by the forces of nature. That is why any failure to act by the fire 
service should properly be characterized as a pure omission; there 
is in general no duty to act to prevent damage caused by third 
parties or by the forces of nature. It also explains why, if a member 
of the emergency services or other rescuer intervenes and does so 
negligently, there will be no liability unless the result is worse than 
would have occurred without intervention. Lord Macphail had also 
indicated in Burnett that in carrying out its statutory functions the 
fire service had created a relationship between itself and the 
pursuer sufficient to give rise to a duty of care at common law. In 
Lord Drummond Young’s opinion, however, for such a duty to 
arise, one of the four exceptions to the general rule of non-liability 
for pure omissions must be engaged.  
Lord Macphail in Burnett had been critical of the reasoning in 
Capital & Counties, stating that he did not understand the role of 
proximity in that case. It had been said that there was insufficient 
proximity for the creation of a general duty of care to the property 
owner but nevertheless sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty 
not to make matters worse. Lord Drummond Young considered 
that there was some force in that criticism and stated (at para.89): 
“[T]he reasoning in Capital & Counties proceeds almost 
entirely on the basis of proximity, whereas it has, I think, now 
been accepted that policy must play a part as well as 
proximity, and that is certainly how I would prefer to analyze 
the position of the fire service and other emergency 
services. As a matter of policy, I would prefer to say that a 
duty is owed by the fire service but, for reasons of policy, the 
scope of that duty is confined to cases where matters are 
made worse by intervention.”   
Lord Macphail had also observed that East Suffolk had not been 
followed in Scotland (so far as it restricted liability to making 
matters worse) but that, in Lord Drummond Young’s view, did not 
render the underlying principle unsound. The principle was based 
on the fact that the damage tackled by an emergency service is 
normally caused by someone else or by the forces of nature. 
Moreover, Lord Macphail’s observation that it was arguable that, 
when a fire brigade was fighting a fire, it owed a duty not to the 
public at large but to the limited class of those whose lives or 
property were endangered, would be dependent on holding that 
the fire brigade had taken control of the situation or had 
undertaken responsibility. Such a conclusion should normally be 
resisted, in Lord Drummond Young’s view, because there is no 
“control” in any proper sense. Lord Macphail also indicated that it 
might be appropriate to say that the pursuer was dependent on the 
fire service for the protection of his property against damage or 
destruction by fire. Acting as firefighters of ordinary competence, 
the firefighters should have sought possible causes of reignition. 
The problem with that analysis, in Lord Drummond Young’s 
opinion, was that it assumed that there was a duty to act to deal 
with a hazard that had been caused by the actings of a third party 
or the forces of nature. 
As far as Gibson was concerned, Lord Drummond Young 
observed that the police there took control of a situation in such a 
way that a duty of care was assumed. That analysis might apply to 
work performed by the police in controlling traffic or dealing with 
hazards on the roads (as was the case in Gibson), but would not 
normally apply to work performed in the prevention and detection 
of crime. 
In Mitchell, the action proceeded against a local authority in 
respect of a fatal assault perpetrated by one of the authority’s 
tenants against another tenant. It was held that the law did not 
impose a positive duty to protect others against harm inflicted by a 
third party. The decision was therefore consistent with the 
approach taken in Capital & Counties and Michael. Lord Hope, 
delivering the leading opinion in Mitchell, adopted the Caparo 
tripartite approach, which test, he emphasized, should be directed 
not merely to whether a duty of care existed but also to its scope. It 
was accepted in Mitchell that the local authority owed duties to its 
tenant in relation to matters such as the state of the property and 
the common parts but it did not extend so far as protecting the 
tenant from harm threatened by a third party. Lord Hope 
emphasized that something more than foreseeability was required 
for liability. No single general principle could provide a practical 
test of universal application. The whole circumstances of the case 
required to be examined in determining whether a duty of care 
should exist, and if so what its scope should be. Lord Hope 
suggested that public policy should govern the scope of any duty 
of care. Lord Drummond Young expressed his agreement with that 
approach (at para.93). He further observed that Lord Brown in 
Mitchell had placed a similar emphasis on policy in considering 
whether it was appropriate that any landlord who is aware of a 
dispute involving one of its tenants should owe a duty of care to 
protect the tenant’s safety. Mitchell therefore could be seen as 
“supporting the view that policy is of vital importance in 
determining the scope of a duty of care and that policy must be 
applied on an essentially casuistic basis” (para.93). 
  
Lord Drummond Young added two final observations. First, the 
issue in AJ Allan related to damage to property. Although in a 
number of English cases it had been said that no distinction could 
be drawn between injury to the person and damage to property, 
such an approach troubled Lord Drummond Young. His view was 
that a distinction might properly be drawn between injury to the 
person and damage to property. The latter is usually covered by 
insurance whereas the former is not. More importantly, the life, 
health and safety of the individual possess a greater moral 
significance than the security and integrity of any property. Lord 
Drummond Young expressed his hope that in an appropriate case 
the law might develop in such a way that, at least in clear cases 
where action can be taken without danger to the rescuer, the 
officers of a public service such as the fire service or police are 
obliged to take action to rescue persons in danger. Although this 
would require a further exception to the general rule that there is 
no liability for a pure omission, Lord Drummond Young expressed 
the view that policy considerations should prevail over a 
mechanical application of the rule. Such a result had been 
achieved in both French and German law.  
The second (and closing) observation of Lord Drummond Young 
was his emphasis on the importance of policy in this area. In a 
passage which merits full quotation, his Lordship stated (at 
para.97): 
“The main development in the law of negligence over the last 
25 years or so has perhaps been a recognition that the 
notion of proximity is limited in its usefulness, and that the 
question of whether there is sufficient to give rise to a duty of 
care of a given scope must depend ultimately on policy 
considerations. Thus an evaluative exercise is required, 
which takes account both of proximity, in the narrower sense 
of physical or causal connection, and policy considerations 
that are specific to the type of case under consideration. The 
result is that, as Lord Bridge stated in Caparo (at page 618), 
“the law has now moved in the direction of attaching greater 
significance to the more traditional categorization of distinct 
and recognizable situations as guides to the existence, the 
scope and the limits of the varied duties of care which the 
law imposes”. Those varying situations, perhaps many in 
number, will determine the policy considerations that should 
govern the existence and scope of any particular duty of 
care. Such development may be incremental and by analogy 
with established categories, as suggested by Brennan J in 
Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1, at 43-
44.  Thus the past may guide the future. The critical point is 
that rules derived from existing case law should not be 
applied mechanically to new situations: instead it should be 
asked whether, as a matter of policy directed to the specific 
situation under consideration, a new analysis is 
required. The result would be a law of negligence that was 
less unified than in the past but which dealt more fairly with 




Given the apparent tension between some of the Scottish and 
English authorities it was perhaps only a matter of time before the 
issue of the potential liability of firefighters in negligence was 
thoroughly ventilated in the Inner House. A direct challenge to the 
authority of the Outer House decision in Burnett appeared 
inevitable and an opportunity to marshal such an attack presented 
itself to the defenders in AJ Allan. That attack was to prove 
ultimately successful before the Inner House where the restricted 
scope of the duty owed by fire services was clearly articulated by 
all three judges. 
The decision of the Inner House to dismiss the action is not 
altogether surprising, particularly in view of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Capital & Counties and the implied criticisms of the 
reasoning in Burnett which have been evident at the highest 
judicial level. Indeed it has been said that “[t]he Scottish cases of 
Duff and Burnett ..have not attracted the approval of the Supreme 
Court and seem to sit uneasily with Mitchell.” (Mackay (supra) per 
Lord McEwan at para.33). It was also said there (at para.37) that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Michael was “a clear brake on the 
creeping extension of liability on public bodies unless clearly 
justified on the facts of the case and binding authorities.”  
The Inner House in AJ Allan has now made a welcome and 
unanimous statement concerning the direction of the law in relation 
to the liability of fire services. Any doubt that the law in Scotland 
differs from that in England is dispelled.  
The most striking element of the judgment in AJ Allan is perhaps 
its emphasis on the increasing importance of policy in judicial 
decision making in relation to the scope of the duty of care. Policy 
considerations are closely examined, most notably in the opinion 
of Lord Drummond Young. In his view, proximity and policy cannot 
be looked at in isolation but rather form parts of a single evaluative 
exercise. They are, to use his Lordship’s terminology, 
“interdependent”. The policy considerations which are pertinent in 
any given case will be specific to the type of situation in question. 
At the heart of the Inner House’s judgment in AJ Allan is the 
underlying policy concern that the scope of liability in negligence of 
the emergency services must be restricted. Unless matters are 
made worse by intervention or a sufficient relationship of proximity 
can be said to exist on account of an undertaking of responsibility, 
it now seems unlikely that emergency services will incur liability in 
negligence. AJ Allan is therefore a decision which will be greeted 
enthusiastically by fire and police services across the country. 
 
